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Abstract
This article analyses the critical connections 
between drones as lethal technological devices, 
visibility, and the very possibility of politics. Dra-
wing on Hannah Arendt’s core postulates on poli-
tics, modern security and society, it problematises 
the political implications of using drones as a pro-
minent security instrument in contemporary life. 
This reading is unpacked through the concept of 
visibility as a critical reference to analyse how secu-
rity policies are dealt with politically. It suggests 
that drones have operated as an instrument of dou-
ble invisibility, both to those living in the contexts 
where they are employed, and to those under 
whose name they are being used. The consequen-
ces of this invisibility for political life and the prac-
tice of security are also discussed in the light of the 
policy under the Obama administration.
Resumo 
Visibilidade e Política: Uma Leitura Arendtiana 
da Política de Emprego dos Drones pelos Estados 
Unidos 
Este artigo analisa as ligações cruciais que existem entre 
drones enquanto equipamentos tecnológicos letais, visi-
bilidade, e a possibilidade da política. Com base nos pres-
supostos fundamentais de Hannah Arendt relativamente 
à política, à segurança e às sociedades modernas, proble-
matiza-se as implicações políticas da utilização de dro-
nes. Esta leitura é articulada através do conceito de visi-
bilidade, enquanto referência crítica para analisar a 
forma como as políticas de segurança são geridas politi-
camente. Sugere-se que os drones têm atuado como um 
instrumento de dupla invisibilidade, tanto para os que 
vivem nos contextos em que os drones são usados, como 
para quem eles são usados. As consequências desta invi-
sibilidade para a vida política e para a prática da segu-
rança são também discutidas à luz da política seguida 
pela administração Obama.
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Introduction 
Technology is radically changing security practices across the world and nothing 
exemplifies it better than the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by 
the United States (US) in multiple theatres of operations across the world. As Presi-
dent Obama’s “weapon of choice”, these so-called drones have been used for dif- 
ferent purposes such as surveillance and tracking, but also as a killing weapon in 
counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency contexts. In a three-page internal assess-
ment released for the first time by the Obama administration on July 2016, the 
drone programme was defined as:
“a combination of both independent and overlapping efforts overseen by the military 
and the CIA – with support from other intelligence community agencies such as the 
NSA [National Security Agency] – that vary in intensity and management depending 
on the country” (Devereaux, 2016). 
Effectively, the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have 
been using lethal drone strikes since 2001 to disrupt and eliminate organisations 
labelled as terrorist such as Al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State (IS). This 
implies that drone strikes have occurred in countries other than those in which the 
US had a direct military engagement, as long as the presence of Al-Qaeda (or IS) 
affiliates can be verified, including countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Somalia and Yemen
 
(Barrinha and da Mota, 2016).
This drone programme, whose intensity and management is so loosely defined by 
the US government, has been severely criticised and documented by legal scholars 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), particularly in relation to non-com-
bat contexts such as Pakistan or Yemen (HRC, 2010; O’Connell, 2010; Stanford and 
NYU, 2012; Reprieve, 2014; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2015). By exten-
sion, the use of drones by the CIA has been censured as well, as the overall secrecy of 
these operations raises important questions of accountability and legitimacy. 
The wider mental configuration of the drone policy seems to occur within what 
Wiebe Bijker (2006) has identified as the dominant paradigm, among politicians 
and practitioners, of technological determinism, which favours a standard image of 
technology as being positive, comforting and that mostly contributes to solving 
problems: 
“technology is viewed as a sufficient end in itself and [...] the values of efficiency, 
power, and rationality are independent of context. The standard view accepts that 
technology can be employed negatively, but in this view the users are to be blamed, 
not the technology” (Bijker, 2006, p. 683). 
The perspective that users are to be blamed may be found in much of the literature 
on the ethics of unmanned military technology (Strawser, 2013); accordingly, intel-
ligence failure or poor decision-making are responsible for operational mistakes 
(Shane, 2015). 
Sarah da Mota e André Barrinha 
 51 Nação e Defesa
This article aims to discuss the ultimate political consequence of a deterministic 
mode of thinking, according to which technology “cannot be subject to ‘outside’ 
control in the form of policy-making or political debate” (Bijker, 2006, p. 683). This 
article draws on Hannah Arendt’s core postulates on politics, modern security, and 
society to problematise the political implications of using drones as a prominent 
security instrument in contemporary (and future) life. The starting point of this 
reflection is that drones are an instrument of double-invisibility: they are invisible 
to those that live in the areas where they are employed and invisible to those under 
whose name they are being used. As it will be seen, such invisibility has important 
consequences in terms of how political life unfolds and, ultimately, on how security 
as a political practice is decided and executed. 
In terms of structure, the article will first unpack the idea of “visibility” as central 
to the study of drones and their impact upon politics, power and security. Visibility, 
we argue, is crucial to understand the fundamental distinction that Arendt offers in 
her work between the private and the public sphere, which ultimately also sheds 
light on the complex dynamics of political secrecy and legitimacy underlying 
the use of drones. The article will then analyse how drones materialise in their 
invisibility and discuss what that means politically. The third part will focus on the 
US drone policy during the Barack Obama tenure in the White House and the 
recent positions he adopted before leaving office. Here, it will be shown that his 
discourse on making the drone policy more accountable seems to express the idea 
of partial repent, in an attempt to give the issue more visibility on the public realm. 
Arendt and the Political Condition of Visibility 
Hannah Arendt’s work became popular (and controversial) during the 1960’s with 
the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil in 1963. She 
was by then a well-established political thinker, having published Origins of Totali-
tarianism (1951) and The Human Condition (1958), among other important works. 
Arendt’s work has been progressively applied to international relations in the last 
decade (Lang and Williams, 2005; Owens, 2007; Frazer and Hutchings, 2008; 
Berkowitz et al., 2010; Buckler, 2011) in particular by authors concerned with the 
conceptual and philosophical connections between war, politics, and ethics. 
Although Arendt is not commonly associated with the study of security – much less 
with the specific issue of drones about which so much has been written in the last 
few years – her work offers important insights on the role and the dangers of tech-
nology in society. As we are moving more firmly towards the technologically-ena-
bled fuzziness between internal and external security (Lutterbeck, 2005), Arendt, as 
the philosopher of plurality and political freedom, certainly assumes an increas-
ingly prominent role in assessing the impact that technology has in the definition 
and implementation of security policies. 
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In Human Condition, Arendt establishes a connection between technology and poli-
tics, when she considers that the direction of scientific and technological progress, 
with its subsequent consequences for the future of human nature on Earth, result 
from a political choice (1998 [1958], p. 4). Politics, in her view, should dictate the nor-
mative fate of technology, drawing on the utilitarian assumption that “[e]very tool 
and implement is primarily designed to make human life easier and human labor 
less painful” (ibid., p. 151). Politics is defined as the ultimate public arena where the 
possibility of freedom lays collectively, and where all must be heard or seen (ibid., 
p. 50). In the public realm of politics, individual freedom cannot be thought outside 
of a collective polity, as politics becomes the public arena of struggle and freedom 
for collective actors. This has to do with Arendt’s conception of politics as action, 
whereby action is described as the only activity directly driven by men without the 
intermediation of things, meaning to take an initiative, to undertake, in order to 
make something work, move or change (ibid., p. 177). 
Accordingly, Arendt suggests, if man is a social animal, action presupposes society, 
and politics cannot be practiced in loneliness. The true basis of politics is the free-
dom of coming together and discussing issues of public interest. Arendt’s concern 
was with this possibility of sharing plurality, more than with the result, or the form 
of the discussion1. This understanding of politics is placed against that of tyranny, 
in which there is no political conflict and no political consensus, but simply the 
elimination of the possibility of both. Following Montesquieu, Arendt (2007, p. 724) 
argued that it is the principle of fear that is at the core of tyrannies: “[t]he tyrant acts 
because he fears his subjects and the oppressed because they fear the tyrant”. 
Political deliberation on the use of technology, or any other matter within a polity, 
should obey the same principle of public, collective debate, and be subject to strug-
gle and discussion. But in the particular case of technology, Arendt’s view suggests 
that the discussion is: 
“not so much whether we are the masters or the slaves of our machines, but whether 
machines still serve the world and its things, or if, on the contrary, they and the auto-
matic motion of their processes have begun to rule and even destroy world and things 
(1998 [1958], p. 151). 
The object of politics should not be human mastery over technology, but its actual 
practical, normative effect upon human life. Arendt is concerned with the possi- 
bility that the automation of destruction depoliticises technology, thus overruling 
the collective, political debate and human capacity for decision. In this sense, 
“visibility” unfolds as the ultimate political condition for technology to remain 
1 Her work has been criticised for its lack of consideration for strategic action. For Amy Allen 
(2002, p. 143), “Arendt’s attempt to exclude strategic action from the domain of the political 
altogether paints too rosy a picture of our political life”.
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within the public realm and within the possibility for human freedom. It is note-
worthy how Arendt’s predicaments on the political challenges posed by technol-
ogy were an early elaboration of what contemporary technology studies have come 
to develop. For instance, Wiebe Bijker (2006, p. 689) discusses the notions of politics 
and democracy as used in technology studies, and highlights the centrality of 
knowledge, transparency, and accountability within the political system of modern 
democracy. Technology is now seen as “producing and upholding a modern demo-
cratic concept of visible power whose exercise appears publicly accountable to the 
large public” (ibid., p. 690; italics added).
Related to the concept of visibility is that of violence. For Arendt, violence as an 
instrument of coercion can destroy power, but power can never grow out of it: 
“power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is 
absent” (1969, p. 56). Actually, the particular use of violence to promote fear signi-
fies the absence of power. The use of violence tends to be opposite to politics, as it 
usually leads to the silencing of plurality. Contrary to power, violence can only be 
politically used if justified, for it must be a means to a given (political) end – war 
or violence in general cannot be justified in any other terms, such as morality2. 
Violence is only justified if used briefly and in order to establish new political spaces 
(Beardsworth, 2008, p. 507). In On Violence (1969), Hannah Arendt defines two con-
texts in which violence is justified – as a response to extreme injustice, and as an 
opener for political space. The use of non-violence requires, as a pre-requisite, that 
there already is some space for politics. As she suggests, Gandhi’s campaign would 
not have succeeded in anti-political places such as Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Soviet 
Union (Frazer and Hutchings, 2008, p. 102). In that sense, violence is never political, 
but it can open the space for its creation. As explained by Elizabeth Frazer and Kim-
berley Hutchings (2008, p. 104):
“Arendt certainly wants to say that [violence] is not political, strictly grammatically 
speaking. But there seems to be no particular reason, on just this account, why politi-
cal actors should reject non-political (strictly speaking) actions if they bring about 
desired political effects. Such as the one that she has in view – making the public 
world in which political action is possible. Of course, for the most part Arendt argues 
that violence is politically ineffective. However, the concession that violence might be 
the only way significantly weakens this strand of her argument.”
Although visibility appears as a fundamental condition for politics and plurality, 
Arendt accepts as an exception to the public realm, that the public going private is 
2 Regarding morality in politics, Arendt follows the Schmittian critique, by refusing to acknowl-
edge its role. As Patricia Owens (2007, p. 508) concludes: “[b]oth Schmitt and Arendt shared a 
belief that morality in political and international affairs could only lead to disillusionment and 
the further intensification and brutalization of war”.
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beneficial for things that need to be hidden from publicity. Private property is “the 
only reliable hiding place from the common public world, not only from everything 
that goes on in it but also from its very publicity, from being seen and being heard” 
(Arendt, 1998 [1958], p. 71). Within the protective security of four walls, humans 
meet a location, a space that is reserved for concealment. 
In Arendt's view, visibility is an essential criterion for the practice of politics, but 
invisibility is no less important as a space for reclusion, where one can get on with 
the aspects of life that are not politically relevant, or what Arendt calls “life pro-
cesses”. As mentioned by Patricia Owens (2011, p. 16):
“The dominance of security does not reside in empowering the sovereign to decide 
the law and exceptions to the law […].
 
The dominant discourses and practices of 
security are exemplary instances of the modern rise of the social, as understood by 
Hannah Arendt. The social is the realm where the ‘life process’ has achieved its own 
public domain; the discourse of security has provided the central justification and 
mechanism for the expansion of the ‘life’ of society under capitalism and the related 
modern belief that life is the highest political good.”
Arendt sees this rise of the social as “the modern discovery of intimacy” (1998 
[1958], p. 69), in which the private realm dissolved. This represents an intrusion 
into the public space, because the fixation of the social with the life process of man-
kind sacrifices action – as the work in concert of a collective (Gordon, 2001, p. 100). 
As a consequence, both public and private spheres are ruined: “the public because 
it has become a function of the private and the private because it has become the 
only common concern left” (Arendt, 1998 [1958], p. 69). To Patricia Owens (2016), 
this phenomenon equals to “household governance”, a form of governance based 
on the “ministration of life processes” in which populations are essentially domes-
ticated and depoliticised – an understanding that is not far from Michel Foucault’s 
biopolitics (2000). In all, the rise of the social makes discourses and practices of 
security more visible, but only to the extent that they exacerbate life’s necessities of 
security, thereby overcoming the private realm, and minimising the security of con-
cealment for the sake of social control. In other words, although security is pro-
vided by, and through, high visibility, it remains fundamentally depoliticised and 
disregards the freedom of populations.
As the next sections will show, it can be argued that the use of drones produces an 
inversion of this visibility-invisibility relation: the politics of security and its execu-
tion become invisible to the public eye, whereas the notion of a secure private envi-
ronment disappears from the areas in which drones are operating. In that regard, 
drones invert the relation between visibility and politics: they hide what is political 
and highlight what is supposed to be private. 
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Drones and Low Visibility: the Security of American Life over Politics?
This section highlights how the low visibility of drone policies results from a 
“disassembled”3 (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009) relationship between control 
and outsourcing that has been managed by the Obama administration in terms of 
covertness and political secrecy. Within that ambiguous equation, political visibility 
has become secondary to the provision of security in the name of North American 
citizens, and has affected both the public realm of other countries, and the very pos-
sibility of freedom for the citizens in foreign territories where drones are used as 
lethal weapons. In this sense, depoliticisation occurs due to an accentuation of the 
US private realm as the realm of freedom, and to the preoccupation with the life 
process (Gordon, 2001, pp. 105-106) within the security of the US’ four walls. 
Secrecy and deception have been recurrently used throughout history as a “means 
to achieve political ends”, and can therefore be seen as “justifiable tools” (Arendt, 
1972, p. 4). However, Arendt raises the question of to whom is concealment des-
tined. Is it ever aimed at the enemy, or is it destined to domestic consumption? 
(ibid., p. 14) Are there any tactical considerations for secrecy4, concealment, or 
lying? As Katharine Kindervater shows (2016), the covert use of military technol-
ogy is not uncommon in the evolution of Western warfare, often combined with 
different techniques of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In this con-
text, the role and involvement of the CIA in the US drone programme is nothing 
particularly new or surprising. Although it has never been clearly acknowledged or 
held accountable, “the highly classified CIA program to kill militants in the tribal 
regions of Pakistan [...] is the world’s worst-kept secret” (Bergen and Tiedemann, 
2010). The insistence on maintaining CIA’s actions non visible has effectively been 
endorsed by Barack Obama, who has referred to legal arguments such as the “state 
secrets privilege” to deflect inquiries into the government’s use of lethal force in 
foreign countries from the beginning of his presidency, and has never forced the 
Agency to publicly answer for the deaths of non-Western civilians during the eight-
year covert bombing campaign (Devereaux and Emmons, 2016). As Simon Chester-
man explains: 
3 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2009) draw on Saskia Sassen’s notion of state “dis-
assembly”, according to which national states disassemble and develop new global assem-
blages incorporating privatisation and globalisation, to approach the growth of private secu-
rity within broader shifts of global governance. They show how the public-private and global/
local distinctions and relationships have been re-articulated into what they term “global secu-
rity assemblages”.
4 In the US, secrecy is no novelty. In 1969, for instance, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
decided to bomb Cambodia without any notice to Congress or the public, and the raids were 
conducted in deepest secrecy (Cockburn, 2015, p. 429).
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“Intelligence services have a chequered history of abuse, but their legitimate activities 
tend to be justified in established democracies by reference to their grounding in the 
rule of law – a relatively recent requirement in some countries
 
– and the existence of 
an accountability chain to democratic institutions” (Chesterman, 2008, p. 1069).
Not only is this political secrecy a real challenge to visibility and accountability, as 
it is reinforced by the “scientific development and knowledge production and prac-
tices of killing and control” (Kindervater, 2016, p. 234). Security increasingly 
depends on a form of specialised and technical knowledge that can only be pro-
vided by a restricted epistemic community of experts, such as in the fields of infor-
mation systems, engineering, robotics, and cybernetics. Many notions and proce-
dures from those fields are unknown to most of the policymakers and require very 
specific skills and information. Such form of knowledge is so technical that it is not 
meant to be public, in the sense that it is not understood or mastered by a vast 
majority of individuals. 
Therefore, developing technologies such as drones, and applying them in contexts 
of warfare, counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency, can ultimately be considered as 
a sophisticated form of contemporary social and political control that is “much bet-
ter symbolized by manipulation than coercion, by remote and invisible limits than 
by guns or handcuffs”, implying “being more covert, embedded and remote, and 
often without the awareness or consent of its subject (Bijker, 2006, p. 687). For the 
Obama administration, this lack of publicity began in the very decision-making 
process designed for drone strikes. Every week during his presidency, Obama held 
a meeting in the White House Situation Room with two dozen of security officials, 
during which he was given a list, or PowerPoint of suspected terrorists, and 
approved each individual name to become a target to kill, based on the suspects’ 
personal biographies (Becker and Shane, 2012). According to the “Drone Papers” – 
a series of secret military documents disclosed by The Intercept in 2015 – there was 
a kill list with selected individual targets for assassination, according to which the 
President only approved the targets, and not each individual strike. As for the CIA, 
it is reported that it has created its own list and rules for strikes, meaning that there 
are additional strikes and deaths to those authorised by the kill list that occur in the 
shadow (Currier, 2015).
Politically, the apology of the use of drones is made in reference to their effective-
ness, and sustained by a discourse of rationality in risk avoidance: 
“Our actions are effective. Dozens of highly skilled core Al-Qaeda commanders,  
trainers, bomb makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have 
been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, US transit systems, 
European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. These strikes have saved lives” (The 
White House, 2013).
This kind of security decisions are part of “reflexive politics” (Rasmussen, 2001), as 
a politics in which meaning is constantly constructed in a rationalisation of risks, in 
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order to manage them despite their latent inexistence. This move promotes preemp-
tive action according to “pre-active politics” (Beck, 2009, p. 41), which privileges 
prevention, expert knowledge and technical solutions over problem-solving prop-
erly said (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, p. 135). As threats such as terrorism are 
hardly controllable or eliminated, governments prefer to act by anticipation than 
run higher risks by not intervening (Coker, 2002, p. 62). 
The targeting and subsequent killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011, an 
American citizen, has been one of the most controversial cases to date, giving rise 
to much questioning and partial attempts at public justification by the Obama 
administration. Andrew Cockburn exposes the case as follows: 
“Anwar al-Awlaki, for example, billed for a time as “the most dangerous man in the 
world,” was publicly nominated to the CIA’s kill list in April 2011. Awlaki had already 
retreated to the heartland of his tribe, the Awalik. It was easy to believe that the fugi-
tive was hidden in the desert fastness, but in fact, as Guardian reporter Ghaith Abdul-
Ahad discovered when he visited the tribe’s ruling Sultan, although everyone in the 
neighborhood knew where the notorious preacher was living, no one seemed inter-
ested in arresting him. “The government haven’t asked us to hand him in,” Sultan 
Fareed bin Babaker told the reporter. “If they do then we will think about it. But no 
one has asked us.
A few weeks before this conversation took place, a pair of Justice Department lawyers 
in Washington had obligingly provided the Obama administration with a secret legal 
justification for summarily executing Awlaki, accepting as a premise that he posed an 
‘imminent’ threat and that his capture was “infeasible” (Cockburn, 2015, p. 3907). 
The fact is that, further to a lawsuit filed by the New York Times and two of its report-
ers, the US federal court has refused to require the Department of Justice to disclose 
a legal justification for the targeted killing of Awlaki (Liptak, 2013). The motivation 
behind this lawsuit was to question US government and to know its legal position 
on the use of targeted killings against persons having ties to terrorism. To the law-
yer of the New York Times, Jameel Jaffer, this ruling “denies the public access to 
crucial information about the government’s extrajudicial killing of US citizens and 
also effectively greenlights its practice of making selective and self-serving disclo-
sures” (Liptak, 2013). Ultimately, this is related to what was mentioned earlier as 
the intromission of security in the individuals “life processes" (Owens, 2011).
Within the context of the US drone policy, concealment is a principle destined to the 
enemies of the US – as in the case of the CIA operating in foreign sole – but it is also 
intended for domestic consumption when the criteria for drone targeting are not 
transparently discussed in the public realm. What we also see with the use of drones 
overseas is a transformation of both the private and public sphere of the countries 
subject to US drone strikes, where contestation or discussion is absent from the 
public view, and where the principle of safety of “private life” is taken as a dispos-
able principle even in non-conflict settings. In Pakistan, for instance, the security of 
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four walls is something that has virtually ceased to exist, as the number of citizens 
subject to the fear of drones largely exceeds the number of potential terrorists (Stan-
ford and NYU, 2012; Allinson, 2015). As argued by Barrinha and da Mota (2016), 
drones have produced fundamentally uninsurable security subjects in the territo-
ries in which they operate: they are subjects perceived as not being entitled to any 
form of secure or securable life. The ultimate consequence is the depoliticisation of 
those contexts (Bijker, 2006, pp. 693-694).
The Expiation of Obama: Attempting to Regain the Political 
As seen so far, the drone programme under the Obama administration has been 
surrounded by secrecy, covert decisional processes, obsolete congressional over-
sight and public silence, outdating to great extent the political condition of visi- 
bility, and eluding a parcel of US public space and freedom. This section focuses on 
how, as its mandate approached to the end, the Obama administration became 
aware of the negative consequences of that political invisibility, and, using Patricia 
Owens (2001, p. 28) words, attempted to re-create a “political island of security” by 
reconstituting the idea that political promises had been kept, thus re-securing a 
“space for freedom”. These notions are offered by Hannah Arendt as well, and help 
reflecting on the possibility for Barack Obama’s presidency to regain the political in 
what regards its drone policy. To Owens, “securing a space for freedom” (2011, 
p. 18) enables a public space of speech and action, in which islands of security can 
be created by making and keeping promises. To sustain this idea, one may illustrate 
Obama’s promises prior to his mandate about how he envisioned his administra-
tion would conduct counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Back in 2007, Obama 
stated: 
“I will not hesitate to use military force to take out terrorists who pose a direct threat 
to America. This requires a broader set of capabilities […]. I will ensure that our mili-
tary becomes more stealth, agile, and lethal in its ability to capture or kill terrorists. We need 
to recruit, train, and equip our armed forces to better target terrorists, and to help foreign 
militaries to do the same” (Obama, 2007; italics added). 
In retrospective, it may be considered that the drone programme implemented 
during Obama's two mandates respected scrupulously what he had planned – 
the lethality in capturing and killing terrorists, but also civilians by extension. 
Accordingly, the number of drone strikes increased very significantly under the 
Obama administration. Although the data officially released in 2016 indicate that 
between 64 and 116 civilians were killed by US drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia and Libya during the two terms of Obama’s presidency, and 2,372 to 2,581 
combatants, it is estimated that the Obama administration conducted nearly nine 
times more strikes than his predecessor Bush (Devereaux, 2016). However, these 
numbers remain very far from the most conservative estimations presented by 
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investigative journalists and independent researchers, as they contrast with the 
estimations of at least 200 and as many as 1,000 civilians killed by American drone 
strikes by organisations like the Long War Journal or the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism (Devereaux and Emmons, 2016).
In 2006, still as Senator for Illinois, Obama had been publicly critical of the Con-
gress overseeing its responsibilities regarding Guantanamo, as he defended the 
fundamental human rights of the detainees as being “bigger than politics” (Obama, 
2006). Later, as a candidate to presidency, Obama referred that the Bush counter-
terrorist policy had become “an excuse for unchecked presidential power”, and 
that America’s “most precious values” had been compromised (Obama, 2007). In 
this sense, he promised he would act differently from George W. Bush in terms of 
political visibility, foretelling the need to foster the capabilities of intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies without undermining the Constitution and freedom 
(Obama, 2007). These political promises help to understand how: 
“Sooner or later, U.S. officials and diplomats toiling to implement what they believed 
was American policy came to realize that there was really only one issue at stake: the 
domestic U.S. political fortunes of the Obama administration. ‘No bombs on my 
watch,’ that’s all they wanted to be able to say,” explained one former Obama White 
House official to me. “Drones were a cheap, politically painless way of dealing with 
that. No one even talked about it very much” (Cockburn, 2015, p. 3799). 
Seemingly, the drone programme might have been painless and uncontroversial 
within the political arena of partisan opposition, but it rapidly became extremely 
controversial among scholars, investigative journalists, and humanitarian organi-
sations. As Arendt says, “there always comes the point beyond which lying becomes 
counterproductive” (Arendt, 1972, p. 7). Many reports were published throughout 
Obama’s presidency, denouncing the illegality, disproportionality, and overall 
wrong-doings of drone targeting (O’Connell, 2010; HRC, 2010; HRW, 2012; Stan-
ford and NYU, 2012; Reprieve, 2014; The Intercept, 2015). The US kept defending, 
throughout Obama's tenure, its drone programme, rebuffing the accusations of 
secrecy and significant death of civilians in Pakistan and elsewhere.  
During this period, there were, however, two changes worth mentioning. The first 
regards the significant reduction in CIA’s drone operations, which saw its activities 
curtailed in places such as Yemen and Syria, with the White House openly prefer-
ring the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to undertake drone lethal oper-
ations whenever possible (Miller, 2016). The second has been unfolding since last 
summer, when the administration released the internal assessment of the drone 
policy in July 2016. This was justified in terms of the nation’s imperative commit-
ment to comply with its obligations under armed conflict, “including those that 
address the protection of civilians, such as the fundamental principles of necessity, 
humanity, distinction, and proportionality” (Devereaux, 2016). 
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Later in October 2016, Obama granted an interview to Jonathan Chait of the New 
York Magazine that is essential to understand his attempt at regaining the political 
before he went out of office. In it, he acknowledges, among other things, the insti-
tutional constraints preventing him from discussing more freely issues related to 
the US drone programme: “we can’t advertise everything that we’re doing without 
inhibiting our effectiveness in protecting the American people” (Chait and Obama, 
2016). About his drone policy he argued that although he does not want the US "to 
get to the point where we’re that comfortable with killing", he thinks people " don’t 
always recognize the degree to which the civilian-casualty rate, or the rate at which 
innocents are killed, in these precision strikes is significantly lower than what hap-
pens in a conventional war" (Chait and Obama, 2016). After avowing his discom-
fort with the practice of targeted killing based on a list, Obama basically justifies the 
civilian deaths by minimising their rate in comparison to conventional warfare. 
Ultimately, there is a consequentialist rationale at play that justifies and legitimises 
everything else. In spite of that, this interview displayed Obama’s attempt to “insti-
tutionalize rigorous debate and an attitude of aiming before you shoot”, and his 
overall concern with “constructing greater transparency” in an effort to institute 
accountability measures for future presidents to come: 
“I haven’t lost my preference for good old-fashioned debate, bills, and the democratic process. 
If there’s one wish that I have for future presidents, it’s not an imperial presidency, it is 
a functional, sensible majority-and-opposition being able to make decisions based on facts and 
policy and compromise. That would have been my preference for the majority of my 
presidency. It was an option that wasn’t always available. But I hope the American 
people continue to understand that that’s how the system should work” (Chait and 
Obama, 2016; italics added).
This statement contains all the elements essential to the realisation of political 
action within the public realm, as Arendt idealised – debate, democracy, political 
pluralism, compromise. However, it seems this was a promise that was not availa-
ble for Obama to keep, and that by speaking of it after all the political shortcomings 
were taken, it is a way of re-bonding with the political. To Naureen Shah, director 
of national security and human rights at Amnesty International: 
“What’s so interesting is that President Obama acknowledges this problem – that 
future presidents will be empowered to kill globally, and in secret. What he doesn’t 
acknowledge is how much of a role his administration had in making that a bizarre 
normal” (quoted in Devereaux and Emmons, 2016). 
Regardless of Obama's personal views on the topic, and late measures in order to 
curb some of the most pernicious effects of his policy, he set the template of how 
drones can be used in international affairs. Obama himself recognises he:
“could see, over the horizon, a situation in which, without Congress showing much  
interest in restraining actions with authorizations that were written really broadly, you end 
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up with a president who can carry on perpetual wars all over the world, and a lot of them 
covert, without any accountability or democratic debate” (Chait and Obama, 2016; italics 
added). 
The minor changes implemented in the last few years of his tenure do not over-
trump the fact that the new president of the US will be able to continue the same 
policy without needing to provide any significant political justification for it. 
Conclusion
This article suggested looking into Obama’s drone policy from an Arendtian 
perspective. By doing this, it enhanced the critical connections existing between 
a contemporary technological device of control and killing, material and political 
visibility, and the very possibility of politics. 
When exploring the conceptual and philosophical possibilities of visibility for tech-
nology in the first part of the article, it was seen that visibility is fundamental for the 
public realm to exist, for politics to work on behalf of human freedom and agency. 
Arendt helps understanding that the application of technology in society is to con-
form to that very principle of visibility, meaning that it should be thought and 
debated having public interest as an ultimate goal. Moreover, when considering the 
violence that may derive from technology such as drones, a central concern arises 
with the possibility that gratuitous acts of destruction through technological 
devices could fundamentally depoliticise violence. What this implies for the way 
security policies are defined is that the invisible application of invisible technology 
denotes the total absence of any political choice, understood as a collective trans-
parent action of men to men. 
These utterances were sustained in the second part of the article, when approach-
ing more specifically the overall drone policy of the Obama administration. Indeed, 
it was seen that the violence drones entail has not been used as a response to 
extreme injustice, or as an opener of political space. On the contrary, the environ-
ment of institutional secrecy in which drones have evolved as a security policy 
indicate an ambiguous interplay of visibility, as they both hide the visibility of pol-
itics domestically and externally, and expose the lives of civilians, guilty or not, 
across the globe through constant surveillance and threat of lethal action. As a con-
sequence, with drones, it is the privilege of a few to know how, and to have access 
to, their functioning, their effects, and their actual contribution to enhance security 
or freedom. 
Finally, the last section of the article provocatively suggested that Obama’s late 
attempt at acknowledging some of the political frailties underlying his drone policy 
was in fact an attempt at “regaining the political”. Despite Obama’s effort to pro-
mote accountability measures and make sure presidents after him follow a different 
practice than his, the reality is he still set a blueprint, whose consequences escape 
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his control in the future. Remarkably, looking at another work from Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, one cannot dismiss the boomerang effect within history. 
Racism and the practice of bureaucratically organised violence were initially mate-
rialised outside Europe by Western imperial powers but would eventually return 
to the metropolis to haunt them. This is a warning from history that one should 
carefully consider. 
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